


A photograph of several soldiers in desert camouflage uniforms and helmets, carrying rifles, walking along a dirt path in a conflict zone. In the background, there are damaged buildings and palm trees under a clear sky.

Islam and the Patterns in Terrorism and Violent Extremism

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(Photo by John Moore/Getty Images)

Introduction

Any analysis of the patterns in terrorism faces major challenges simply because of the lack of reliable and comparable data, and the tendency to compartmentalize analysis to deal with given threats, nations, and regions. The problem becomes much greater when the analysis attempts to deal with issues as controversial as the links between Islam, extremism, and terrorism.

Putting the Links Between Islam and Violent Extremism in Context

It is far too easy for analysts who are not Muslim to focus on the small part of the extremist threat that Muslim extremists pose to non-Muslims in the West and/or demonize one of the world's great religions, and to drift into some form of Islamophobia -- blaming a faith for patterns of violence that are driven by a tiny fraction of the world's Muslims and by many other factors like population, failed governance, and weak economic development.

It is equally easy to avoid analyzing the links between extremist violence and Islam in order to be politically correct or to avoid provoking Muslims and the governments of largely Muslim states. The end result is to ignore the reality that most extremist and terrorist violence does occur in largely Muslim states, although it overwhelmingly consists of attacks by Muslim extremists on fellow Muslims, and not some clash between civilizations.

If one examines a wide range of sources, however, a number of key patterns emerge that make five things very clear:

- First, the overwhelming majority of extremist and violent terrorist incidents do occur in largely Muslim states.
- Second, most of these incidents are perpetrated by a small minority of Muslims seeking power primarily in their own areas of operation and whose primary victims are fellow Muslims.
- Third, almost all of the governments of the countries involved are actively fighting extremism and terrorism, and most are allies of Western states that work closely with the security, military, and counterterrorism forces of non-Muslim states to fight extremism and terrorism.
- Fourth, the vast majority of Muslims oppose violent extremism and terrorism, and,
- Fifth, religion is only one of many factors that lead to instability and violence in largely Muslim states. It is a critical ideological force in shaping the current patterns of extremism, but it does not represent the core values of Islam and many other far more material factors help lead to the rise of extremism.

This analysis draws on a wide range of sources to illustrate these trends and how the global patterns in terrorism and violence interact with Islam. It cannot overcome the lack of consistent and reliable data in many key areas, or the fact that many key factors do not lend themselves to summary quantification and trend analysis. It is also impossible to go into depth in analyzing the individual trends in Islam and extremism in a broad overview of global trends, or to highlight all of the limits in the quality and reliability of the data available.

The analysis does, however, make use of the same START database that the U.S. State Department uses in drafting its annual country reports on terrorism. While there is no agreement between open source databases in terms of numbers, there does seem to be broad agreement as to the direction and intensity of most trends. Uncertain as the numbers may be, the vectors in these numbers do seem to reflect many areas of consensus. (See [Global Terrorism Database - START.umd.edu](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/), <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.)

It also draws on a wide range of other materials to reflect recent polling of Muslim opinion, data on the broader divisions that lead to violence and extremism in much of the Muslim world, and various official sources to show the trends in the current "wars" on terrorism, the degree to which partnerships between Muslim and non-Muslim states form the core of the effort to defeat extremism, and the extent to which the rise of extremism ensures that it may take several decades of active security partnerships to end the threat.

Global Patterns of Terrorism Are Dominated by Extremism in Largely Muslim States (pages 9-17)

The first section of the report makes it clear that the patterns of extremist violence are dominated by violence in largely Muslim states and by extremist movements that claim to represent Islamic values. It shows that the START database counts a total of 70,767 terrorist incidents between 2011 and the end of 2016. A total of 60,320 of these incidents -- 85% of the global total -- occurred in largely Islamic states. A total of 51,321 of these incidents -- 73% of the global total -- occurred in the Islamic states in the Middle East and North Africa or MENA region.

It is important to note, however, that only a relatively small portion of the incidents can be attributed to ISIS, even using the highest START estimate. More broadly, even if Afghanistan is added to the total for Iraq and Syria, the three major countries where the U.S. and other outside states partner with Muslim governments accounted for 26,113 incidents -- or only 37% of the global total. Moreover, even if one counts all of the MENA region and South Asia, key organized extremist groups like Al Qaida, Al Nusra, ISIS, and the Taliban accounted for 12,159 incidents or 17% of the total. Defeating today's key perpetrators is critical, but it in no way will defeat the longer term threat.

But, there is No “Clash of Civilizations.” The Vast Majority of Muslims Consistently Reject Extremism and Terrorism (pages 18-28)

The second section of the report draws on a range of polls to put these statistics on incidents into perspective. There is no poll of opinion in every Muslim or Arab state, and many of the polls available -- including the ones in this report -- have serious flaws and limitations. Nevertheless, the polling data still seem good enough -- and consistent enough -- to show that the vast majority of Muslims do not support extremist violence, and that their primary concerns are jobs, the quality of governance, security, and the same practical values shared by non-Muslims.

Moreover, for all the talk of "foreign fighters," even the high estimates in the media represent a negligible portion of the total number of young men who might join in such movements. Arab youth do not support extremist violence. Moreover, the small portion that does in given countries in given polls is often reacting to a crisis in Israeli-Palestinian relations or some other major incident, and that limited support tends to drop sharply when it no longer is driven by the heat of the moment.

The Battle of Perceptions, and Popular Motives in the MENA Region and Islamic World (pages 293-34)

The third section supplements the second by showing that only 17% of Muslims saw religion as the key factor in recruiting fighters for ISIS, and that interpretations of Islam ranked seventh in a poll examining Arab views of way to defeat extremism. At the same time, it warns that the rejection of extremism and terrorism does not there was popular support for many U.S. and other western foreign policies. Moreover, 77% of Arabs polled still felt that the Arab peoples were a single nation, rather than focused on the actions of their government and their own nation situation.

Casualties in the U.S. and Europe Are All Too Real. But, it is Muslims that Are the Overwhelming Victims of Extremist Attacks (pages 35-39)

The fourth section of the report shows the trends in terms of death, injuries, and kidnappings/hostage taking. No one can condone or ignore the numbers killed in the U.S. and Europe, but they are relatively tiny in actuarial terms. For example, there were 658 deaths in Europe and all of the Americas between January 1, 2015 and July 16, 2016. There were 28,031 -- or 43 times more deaths -- in other regions -- most of them consisting of largely Islamic countries. Almost all of the human impact of extremist attacks is Muslims killing or injuring fellow Muslims.

Seven of the ten countries with the most terrorist attacks in 2016 had vast Muslim majorities, and the death and injuries in the other three involve large numbers of Muslim deaths. A total of 83% of the attacks and 90% of the deaths occurred in solidly Islamic countries. The vast majority of suicide and vehicle attacks came from "Islamist" extremist groups that killed Muslims in largely Muslim countries.

If one looks at the five worst perpetrator movements in the world in 2016, four are "Islamist" extremist. A total of 88% of 2,916 attacks and 99% of 14,017 deaths that resulted from the top five perpetrators were caused by Islamic extremist groups.

Restrictions on Religion Attempt to Limit Extremism in Much of the Islamic World (pages 40-46)

The fifth section makes it clear that most governments in largely Muslim states are actively moving to suppress religious extremism in their country. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism and Treasury Department lists of designated groups and individuals funding terrorism show both major progress in largely Muslim states in fighting extremism and limiting the funding and support of extremist groups *and that much more needs to be done*.

At the same time, work by the Pew Trust highlights the fact that many largely Muslim states have placed growing limits on extremist preaching and religious activity. This necessarily interferes with freedom of religion and speech, and given states often exert excessive limits and control, but vague charges that such governments are failing to act do not reflect the real-world actions of many -- if not most -- governments in largely Muslim states. (See [International Religious Freedom Report - US Department of State](https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/), <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/>; and [Country Reports on Terrorism - US Department of State](https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/>.)

Islamophobia is Dangerous and Ignores Muslim Patriotism and Support for Their Country in Nations Outside the Muslim World (pages 47-54)

The sixth section provides a short case state in the dangers of Islamophobia. Polling data illustrates the degree to which American Muslims show consistent loyalty and support for the U.S. It also shows that the vast majority of terrorist attacks in the U.S. did not involve Muslims, and that those attacks that did involve "Islamist" motives were generally by American-born Muslims or full citizens and not by recent immigrants.

The data also show that American Muslims have seen some slight rises in the violent impact of Islamophobia. The risks of becoming a U.S. victim of Islamist violence have been tiny relative to other causes of death and violent death since 2011, but the size of anti-Muslim hate crimes has grown. Islamist violence still produces more deaths, but FBI reporting shows that anti-Muslim hate crimes produce higher levels of overall violence, rape, and serious injury.

Extremism Poses a Critical Threat to the Ability of Largely Islamic States to Meet the Needs of Their Rapidly Growing Populations (pages 55-83)

The data and trend charts in the seventh section provide a wide range of metrics showing the other pressures that divide largely Muslim states, and that can drive their populations towards extremism. Each can be a study in itself, but it is clear that many Muslims feel their governments are corrupt and that secular options fail to protect them and provide adequate future opportunities.

Population pressure and corruption are critical factors, as are ethnic and sectarian divisions and hyperurbanization. Youth lack jobs and opportunity in many states, and per capita incomes are sometimes critically low. (For detailed country-by-country comparisons, see Instability in the MENA Region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Key Conflict states: A Comparative Score Card, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170928_Scoring_Instability_MENA.pdf?Rx8YruTusj_FyLrQjXRMCQQB.xVZ.63F, or <https://www.csis.org/analysis/instability-mena-region-afghanistan-pakistan-and-key-conflict-states-comparative-score-card>.)

Islamic States Are Key Strategic Partners in the Fight Against Extremism, and the Rising Global Impact of Islam Makes These Partnerships Steadily More Critical (pages 84-88)

The eighth section of the report highlights two key factors in dealing with the threat of "Islamist" extremism. First, almost all of the states with large Muslim majorities have governments that already cooperate with the U.S. in the struggle against extremism. These strategic partnerships are critical to containing the threat and limiting its impact outside the countries where it is now centered.

Second, the need for lasting strategic partnerships with Muslim states is reinforced by key demographic trends on a global basis. Work by the Pew Research Center estimates that the total number of Muslims will increase from 1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.76 billion in 2015 -- an increase of 73% or 1.16 billion people.

Dividing the world on a religious basis, or even seriously alienating a substantial portion of the world's Muslims could create all too real a clash between key elements of the global population and economy.

ISIS, Al Qaida and the Taliban Are Key *Current* Threats, But only One Small Part of a Far Broader Problem that Will Endure for Decades (pages 89-99)

The trend charts in this section reinforce the points made in the previous sections about the enduring threat that extremism and instability poses to the Islamic world and the state outside it.

When they are compared to the previous trend data on incidents and deaths, they show that Al Qaida, ISIS, the Taliban, and the other main targets of today's anti-terrorism and anti-extremist efforts are only a comparatively limited part of even current threats.

Even Total Victory in Syria and Iraq will Only Have a Limited Impact: Most IISS "Affiliates" Outside Iraq and Syria Are Not Closely Linked to the ISIS "Caliphates" and Will Survive ISIS Defeats in Iraq and Syria (pages 103-107)

It is striking that ISIS's "affiliates" outside the current range of major military efforts -- those only tenuously tied to ISIS central -- have been responsible for more terrorist incidents than ISIS central has been in Syria and Iraq.

The Current Fighting in Syria and Iraq is Unlikely to Bring Any Lasting Security and Stability (pages 108-131)

The data in this section of this report documents major progress in fighting ISIS and a major joint military effort between a US led coalition and host country allies. It also, however, highlights the lack of any clear grand strategy to bring security and stability to Syria and Iraq. Defeating extremist organizations like Al Qaida, ISIS, and Al Nusra will be a critical step in limiting the threat, but even near total defeat of today's major perpetrators will leave major cadres and large numbers of fighters.

As yet, there are no indications that such defeats will be followed by recovery and reform efforts that will bring lasting security and stability to the divisions within Syria and Iraq shown in this section. Extremist groups will remain, governance and economic development will be weak and divided, ethnic and sectarian differences will be critical, and the outside role of powers like Iran, Russia, and Turkey will be deeply divisive.

Limited tactical victories are no substitute for a meaningful grand strategy that addresses the lasting outcome of such victories.

This is Even More True of the Fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan (pages 132-146)

The trend data in this section show that even tactical success is uncertain in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Again, there is no clear indication of the capability to build on the defeat of the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other extremist groups to bring lasting security and stability to either Afghanistan or Pakistan


Terrorism and Extremism in Yemen Have Become a Strategic “Black Hole” (pages 147-154)

The final section in the report provides a different kind of warning. It shows that the cost of failing to create effective strategic partnerships can be far greater and more destabilizing even if such partnerships only really address a limited part of a nation's tensions and divisions and focus almost exclusively on security.

Yemen is only one such case study. Libya, Somalia, the Sudans, and a number of Sub Saharan African countries already present similar challenges. The study referenced earlier in section seven, Instability in the MENA Region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Key Conflict states: A Comparative Score Card, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170928_Scoring_Instability_MENA.pdf?Rx8YruTusj_FyLrQjXRMCCQB.xVZ.63F, or <https://www.csis.org/analysis/instability-mena-region-afghanistan-pakistan-and-key-conflict-states-comparative-score-card>.) -- highlights the scale of these challenges and causes of current and future extremism.

Global Patterns of Terrorism are Dominated by Extremism in Largely Muslim States


Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016



Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.

[http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_m
onth=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&ctp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&ctp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=)

Number of Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016: (70,767 Total)



MENA & South Asia = 51,321

or 73%

MENA is 39%

South Asia is 34%

Afghanistan and Pakistan =

17,818 or 25%


Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.

10/17/2017 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=regions&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dt2=all®ion=12,2,7,4,9,10,1,3,6,5,11,8

Terrorist Attacks in Heavily Islamic Regions: 2011-2016

60,320 Incidents

- 85% of world total
- 7% caused by some element of ISIS




Source: START database,

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2015&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&ctp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

All Incidents in MENA and South Asia Regions: 2011-2016

51,321 Incidents




Years: (between 2011 and 2016), All incidents regardless of doubt.

Source: START,

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31


Number of Terrorist Attacks in Key U.S. Conflict Countries 2011-2016



Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=all&country=4,95,147,153,182,1004,195,200,228


Number of Terrorist Attacks in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan: 2011-2016



Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.

Incidents From Major Groups the U.S. is Fighting in MENA and South Asia Regions: 2011-2016

Perpetrators: (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al-Shabaab; Badr Brigades; Haqqani Network; Houthi extremists (Ansar Allah); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Taliban; Taliban (Pakistan))



Source: START, **Years:** (between 2011 and 2016), All incidents regardless of doubt.

10/17/2017 https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=pie&chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&start_year=2015&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2015&end_month=12&end_day=31

Perpetrators of Suicide and Vehicle Bombings

Five perpetrator groups responsible for most suicide and vehicle bombings, 1970 - 2016

Suicide Bombings				Vehicle Bombings			
Perpetrator	Number of Attacks	Percent of Global Total	Percent Total Attacks	Perpetrator	Number of Attacks	Percent of Global Total	Percent Total Attacks
ISIL	1,184	20.8%	22.9%	ISIL	1,594	14.8%	30.9%
Taliban	637	11.2%	9.7%	Taliban	480	4.4%	7.3%
Boko Haram	300	5.3%	14.4%	IRA	220	2.0%	8.2%
TTP	166	2.9%	12.9%	ETA	191	1.8%	9.4%
Al-Shabaab	133	2.3%	5.0%	Al-Shabaab	187	1.7%	7.0%


But, There is No “Clash of Civilizations”

**The Vast Majority of Muslims
Consistently Reject
Extremism and Terrorism**

Muslim Support for Extremism: 2013- I

Great Concern for Extremism

How concerned are you about Islamic extremism in your country?




Based on Muslims only.

Median % across 11 Muslim publics.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q35.

Views of Extremist Groups

Median % with an unfavorable view of ...




Based on Muslims only.

Median % across 11 Muslim publics.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q9j-l, Q9q, Q41b, & Q41d.

Most Are Concerned about Islamic Extremism



Based on Muslims only.



PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q35.

Muslim Support for Suicide Bombing: 2013

Majorities Say Suicide Bombing Not Justified

% of Muslims who say suicide bombing in defense of Islam is ...

■ Rarely/never justified
■ Often/sometimes justified



There are some countries in which substantial minorities think violence against civilians is at least sometimes justified. This view is particularly widespread among Muslims in the Palestinian territories (40%), Afghanistan (39%), Egypt (29%) and Bangladesh (26%).

Muslim Support for Extremism: 2013 - II

Muslim Views on Suicide Bombing

Suicide bombings can be justified...

	Often	Some- times	Rarely	Never	DK	NET Often/Some
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Pakistan	1	2	4	89	4	3
Indonesia	1	5	12	81	2	6
Nigeria	2	6	7	78	7	8
Jordan	3	9	32	53	3	12
Tunisia	5	7	6	77	6	12
Turkey	3	13	17	54	14	16
Senegal	11	7	14	50	18	18
Egypt	10	15	34	39	2	25
Malaysia	5	22	12	58	3	27
Lebanon	9	24	25	41	2	33
<i>Shia</i>	10	29	25	33	2	39
<i>Sunni</i>	8	18	24	47	2	26
Palest. ter.	37	25	12	16	10	62


Asked of Muslims only.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Q121.

Foreign Fighters are Negligible Part of Population Base: 5/2015

Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq

Per million
population




Note: Upper estimates used. Countries with fewer than 500 fighters not included

Source: ICSR, CIA World Factbook

CSIS TNT Estimate of Uncertainty in the Increasing Number of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria: 2013-2016

ODNI = Office of the Director of National Intelligence

ICSR = International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Violence



Source: Maria Galperin Donnelly with Thomas M. Sanderson and Zack Fellman, *Foreign Fighters in History*, CSIS, Transnational Threats, 2017

Arab Support for ISIL: 2016




Figure 1 An overwhelming majority of Arabs has negative views of ISIL.

Attitudes towards ISIL	Self-defined religiosity		
	Very religious	Religious, to some extent	Not religious
Very positive	4	2	3
Positive, to some extent	4	2	3
Negative, to some extent	11	9	11
Negative	81	87	83
	To keep up with modern economy, banks should be allowed to charge interest		
	Agree		Disagree
Positive/varying extents	6		5
Negative/varying extents	94		95
	Would be better for my home country if religion was separated from politics		
	Agree		Disagree
Positive/varying extents	5		6
Negative/varying extents	95		94


Source: **Arab Opinion Index, March 13, 2017, pp. 1.**

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania**. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples..


Arab Youth Largely See ISIS/ISIL/Daesh as a Threat

FOR THE SECOND YEAR IN A ROW, ARAB YOUTH VIEW THE RISE OF DAESH AS THE TOP OBSTACLE FACING THE MIDDLE EAST AND NEARLY 4 IN 5 EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE TERRORIST GROUP'S RISE.

What do you believe is the biggest obstacle facing the Middle East?



How concerned would you say you are about the rise of Daesh?





Arab Youth Does Not Support ISIS's Core Ideology- I



NEARLY 4 IN 5 YOUNG ARABS RULE OUT ANY SUPPORT FOR THE GROUP EVEN IF DAESH STOPPED USING SO MUCH VIOLENCE AND MOST BELIEVE IT WILL ULTIMATELY FAIL TO ESTABLISH AN ISLAMIC STATE.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the statement?

“If Daesh did not use so much violence,
I could see myself supporting it”





“Daesh will ultimately establish an Islamic
State in the Arab world”



Arab Youth Does Not Support ISIS's Core Ideology- II

FEWER THAN HALF OF ARAB YOUTH BELIEVE THERE ARE GOOD JOB OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO THEM, AND THE ISSUE IS PARTICULARLY ACUTE IN THE COUNTRIES WHERE DAESH HAS ACTIVELY RECRUITED YOUNG PEOPLE.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the statement?
“There are good job opportunities in the area I live in”



Most Youth see the “Arab Spring” Has Made Things Worse and Prefer Stability over Democracy

THE PERCEIVED LEGACY OF THE ARAB SPRING CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE, AND EGYPT IS THE ONLY ARAB SPRING COUNTRY THAT BELIEVES THE ARAB WORLD IS BETTER OFF BECAUSE OF IT.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the statement?
“Following the Arab Spring, I feel the Arab world is better off”


All Countries

Showing % agree



The Four Arab Spring Countries



Showing % agree



WITH THE NUMEROUS ISSUES FACING THE REGION AND THE LEGACY OF THE ARAB SPRING UNCERTAIN, MORE THAN HALF OF YOUNG ARABS TODAY FAVOUR STABILITY OVER DEMOCRACY, THOUGH YOUTH IN LEVANT & YEMEN IS DIVIDED.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the statement?

“Given the current circumstances in the Middle East, promoting stability in the region is more important than promoting democracy”




The Battle of Perceptions, and Popular Motives in the MENA Region and Islamic World

What Helps ISIL Recruit?: 2016

Top factors helping ISIL recruitment, according to Arab respondents

(Only factors selected by more than 5 percent of respondents in each country are represented)



- 22 percent cited economic difficulties,
- 18 percent “brainwashing” and “propaganda,”
- 17 percent religious rhetoric,
- 11percent domestic political concerns,
- 7 percent marginalization and inequality,
- 6 percent attributed it to extremist individuals
- 5 percent to the desire to fight foreign powers.

Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 14 .**

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.** Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples..


Arab Views of How to Defeat ISIL: 2016

Remedies offered to defeat ISIL	First most significant	Second most significant	Averaged score
Intensify military efforts	17	14	15
End foreign intervention	15	18	17
Resolve the Palestinian Cause	14	8	11
Support the Arab democratic transition	14	6	10
Resolve the Syrian conflict in a manner which responds to the aspirations of the Syrian people	12	8	10
Resolving economic questions: unemployment, poverty and price inflation	7	14	10
Purging extremist interpretations of Islam	6	12	9
Ending the sectarian policies of some Arab states	4	8	6
Spreading a culture of religious tolerance	2	5	4
Ending the Libyan crisis in a manner which meets the aspirations of the Libyan people	1	3	2
Do not know/declined to answer	7	--	4
No second answer given	--	5	2

Source: Arab Opinion Index, March 13, 2017, pp. 3.

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples..

Arab View of External Foreign Policies: 2016




Source: Arab Opinion Index, March 13, 2017, pp. 8.

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania**. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples..

Arab View of U.S. Policies: 2016


When asked to look at specific US foreign policy areas, vast majorities of Arabs had negative views of US policy toward Palestine (80 percent), Syria (77 percent), Iraq (78 percent), Yemen (71 percent), and Libya (72 percent).



Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 3 .**

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.** Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples..

The Arab Peoples are a Single Nation: 2016



Source: **Arab Opinion Index, March 13, 2017, pp. 7.**


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**Casualties in the U.S. and
Europe are All Too Real**

But

**It is Muslims that Are the
Overwhelming Mass of
Victims of Extremist Attacks**

Terrorist Attacks in Europe and the Americas versus Rest of the World: January 1, 2015 – July 16, 2016



Source: Jane's IHS; [Lazaro Gamio](#) and [Tim Meko](#) "How terrorism in the West compares to terrorism everywhere else, Washington Post," July 17, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/the-scale-of-terrorist-attacks-around-the-world/?hpid=hp_no-name_graphic-story-a%3Ahomepage%2Fstory,

Ten countries with the most terrorist attacks, 2016

	Total Attacks		Total Deaths*		Deaths per Attack*		Total Injured*		Injured per Attack*		Total Kidnapped/ Hostages	
	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015
Iraq	2965	2417	9764	6973	3.44	3.01	13314	11900	4.74	5.25	8586	4008
Afghanistan	1340	1716	4561	5312	3.58	3.24	5054	6250	4.03	3.99	1673	1134
India	927	798	337	289	0.38	0.38	636	500	0.73	0.66	317	866
Pakistan	734	1010	955	1087	1.34	1.11	1729	1338	2.43	1.37	450	279
Philippines	482	490	272	260	0.58	0.54	418	430	0.90	0.90	216	127
Nigeria	466	588	1832	4940	4.35	9.13	919	2786	2.66	7.70	265	858
Syria	363	387	2088	2767	6.42	7.91	2656	2830	9.16	9.63	1406	1476
Turkey	363	309	657	337	1.81	1.11	2282	828	6.37	2.78	18	141
Yemen	363	460	628	1517	1.89	3.90	793	2599	2.44	6.97	173	456
Somalia	359	241	740	659	2.18	3.05	943	463	2.91	2.28	373	161
Worldwide	11072	12121	25621	29424	2.44	2.56	33814	37419	3.32	3.40	15543	12264

***Includes perpetrators**

In 2016, a total of 11,072 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, resulting in more than 25,600 total deaths and more than 33,800 people injured. These casualty figures include more than 6,700 perpetrator deaths and 1,600 perpetrator injuries. In addition, more than 15,500 people were kidnapped or taken hostage.

83% of attacks and 90% of deaths came in solidly Islamic countries, and most in partially Islamic countries had links to Islamic extremists

Key Metrics for Suicide and Vehicle Bombings

Five countries that experienced the most suicide and vehicle bombings, 1970 – 2016

Suicide Bombings				Vehicle Bombings			
Country	Number of Attacks	Percent of Global Total	Percent Vehicle	Country	Number of Attacks	Percent of Global Total	Percent Suicide
Iraq	2,270	39.7%	64.7%	Iraq	5,379	49.8%	27.3%
Afghanistan	1,092	19.1%	43.5%	Afghanistan	913	8.5%	52.0%
Pakistan	478	8.4%	31.8%	Pakistan	515	4.8%	29.5%
Syria	285	5.0%	71.6%	Syria	398	3.7%	51.3%
Nigeria	265	4.6%	20.8%	United Kingdom	320	3.0%	0.0%

Five perpetrator groups responsible for most suicide and vehicle bombings, 1970 - 2016

Suicide Bombings				Vehicle Bombings			
Perpetrator	Number of Attacks	Percent of Global Total	Percent Total Attacks	Perpetrator	Number of Attacks	Percent of Global Total	Percent Total Attacks
ISIL	1,184	20.8%	22.9%	ISIL	1,594	14.8%	30.9%
Taliban	637	11.2%	9.7%	Taliban	480	4.4%	7.3%
Boko Haram	300	5.3%	14.4%	IRA	220	2.0%	8.2%
TTP	166	2.9%	12.9%	ETA	191	1.8%	9.4%
Al-Shabaab	133	2.3%	5.0%	Al-Shabaab	187	1.7%	7.0%

Five perpetrator groups with the most attacks worldwide, 2016:

88% of 2,916 attacks and 99% of 14,017 deaths in 2016 were from Islamic extremist groups

	Total Attacks		Total Deaths*		Total Injured*		Total Kidnapped/ Hostages	
	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015	2016	2015
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)**	1133	969	9114	6178	7671	6608	8379	4805
Taliban	848	1104	3615	4535	3572	4758	1498	975
Maoists/Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)	336	347	174	177	141	156	171	707
Al-Shabaab	332	226	740	836	921	561	375	559
Houthi Extremists	267	292	374	978	568	1704	137	387

* Includes perpetrators


** Excludes attacks attributed to branches of ISIS or ISIS-inspired individuals

Source: START Annex of Statistical Information, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*, July 2017, p. 15

Restrictions on Religion Attempt to Limit Extremism in Much of the Islamic World

Western Public Concern over Domestic Islamic Terrorism: 2005-2014: Pew Trust

Concern about domestic Islamic extremism has increased to the highest levels in 2015.



Source: Pew

Trends in Number of Countries Where There is Harassment of Given Religions

Number of countries where religious groups were harassed, by type of harassment

Government harassment in the year ...

	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15
Christians	79	80	71	95	78	81	85	79	97
Muslims	77	74	58	74	78	83	73	80	106
Jews	11	16	14	21	28	28	39	31	43
Others*	25	28	29	40	39	34	33	39	44
Folk religions**	13	10	9	10	5	11	12	13	16
Hindus	12	11	9	13	9	13	8	9	14
Buddhists	7	7	6	11	5	9	7	8	5
Unaffiliated	CODING WAS NOT DONE					2	1	1	9
Any of above	118	112	103	124	129	131	133	129	157

Social harassment in the year ...

	'07	'08	'09	'10	'11	'12	'13	'14	'15
Christians	74	72	70	77	81	83	71	85	94
Muslims	64	53	58	64	82	88	84	81	94
Jews	46	48	60	64	63	66	72	80	67
Others*	15	13	19	28	18	20	17	17	18
Folk religions**	16	13	19	20	21	18	26	12	23
Hindus	12	9	8	10	6	9	4	7	11
Buddhists	4	4	4	7	5	7	7	3	3
Unaffiliated	CODING WAS NOT DONE					2	4	3	6
Any of above	127	110	124	135	150	147	145	139	146

*Includes Sikhs, members of ancient faiths such as Zoroastrianism, members of newer faiths such as Baha'i and other religious groups.

**Includes, for example, followers of African traditional religions, Chinese folk religions, Native American religions and Australian aboriginal religions.

Note: This measure does not assess the severity of the harassment. Numbers do not add to totals because multiple religious groups can be harassed in a country.

Countries with Very High Social Hostilities Involving Religion:

7.2 point score or higher out of 10

Eleven countries had “very high” levels of social hostilities involving religion in 2015, the same number as in 2014.

Despite the overall number of countries in this category remaining constant, there was some movement into and out of this category in 2015. Russia and Egypt had very high levels of social hostilities in 2015, but not in 2014; meanwhile, Lebanon and Sri Lanka fell out of the “very high” category in 2015.

The number of countries with “low” levels of social hostilities involving religion dropped from 98 in 2014 to 87 in 2015.

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Restrictions on Religion Rise Modestly in 2015, Reversing Downward Trend, April 11, 2017, p. 16, <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/04/11/global-restrictions-on-religion-rise-modestly-in-2015-reversing-downward-trend/>.

2014	2015
Israel	Syria
Iraq	Nigeria
Syria	Iraq
Yemen	India
Pakistan	Israel
Sri Lanka	Yemen
India	Russia
Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Lebanon	Palestinian territories
Palestinian territories	Pakistan
Nigeria	Egypt

Note: Gray indicates a country that had very high social hostilities in 2014 but not in 2015. Bold indicates a country that had very high social hostilities in 2015 but not in 2014.

Government Control of Religion vs. Religion and Social Hostilities


Middle East-North Africa continues to have highest government restrictions on religion

Median scores on the Government Restrictions Index, by region



increase in social hostilities involving religion in 2015


Median scores on the Social Hostilities Index, by region



Source: Pew Research Center, Global Restrictions on Religion Rise Modestly in 2015, Reversing Downward Trend, April 11, 2017, p. 26, 28
<http://www.pewforum.org/2017/04/11/global-restrictions-on-religion-rise-modestly-in-2015-reversing-downward-trend/>.

Country Levels of Government Restrictions on Religion

Level of government restrictions on religion in each country as of December 2015



Source: Pew Research Center analysis of external data. See Methodology for details.

"Global Restrictions on Religion Rise Modestly in 2015, Reversing Downward Trend"

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Restrictions on Religion Rise Modestly in 2015, Reversing Downward Trend, April 11, 2017, p. 27
<http://www.pewforum.org/2017/04/11/global-restrictions-on-religion-rise-modestly-in-2015-reversing-downward-trend/>.

Countries with High Government Control of Religion:

(6.6 point score or higher out of 10)

In 2015, 23 of the 198 countries in the study had “very high” levels of government restrictions, up from 16 countries in 2014.¹³ Some countries – like China, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran – have had very high levels of restrictions every year since 2007, the first year for which data are available.

Other countries may fluctuate into and out of this top category. Eight countries had very high levels of government restrictions in 2015 but not in 2014: Vietnam, Singapore, Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Eritrea, Brunei and Mauritania. Laos was the only country to fall out of this category in 2015.

The number of countries with “high” levels of restrictions fell somewhat, from 31 countries in 2014 to 27 countries in 2015, although this was mainly due to some countries moving into the “very high” category.

Meanwhile, the number of countries with “low” levels of restrictions decreased from 2014 to 2015 (from 92 to 87).

Source: Pew Research Center, Global Restrictions on Religion Rise Modestly in 2015, Reversing Downward Trend, April 11, 2017, p. 15, <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/04/11/global-restrictions-on-religion-rise-modestly-in-2015-reversing-downward-trend/>.

2014	2015
China	Egypt
Egypt	China
Uzbekistan	Iran
Turkey	Russia
Iran	Uzbekistan
Indonesia	Malaysia
Syria	Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia	Indonesia
Kazakhstan	Syria
Azerbaijan	Morocco
Turkmenistan	Iraq
Laos	Algeria
Malaysia	Tajikistan
Maldives	Brunei
Russia	Turkmenistan
Tajikistan	Azerbaijan
	Turkey
	Kazakhstan
	Eritrea
	Singapore
	Maldives
	Mauritania
	Vietnam

Note: Gray indicates a country that had very high government restrictions in 2014 but not in 2015. Bold indicates a country that had very high government restrictions in 2015 but not in 2014.

Islamophobia is Dangerous and Does Not Reflect Muslim Opinion Outside the Muslim World


**American Muslims Show Consistent
Loyalty and Support for the U.S.**

And,

**Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Exceed the
Damage Done by Islamic Extremists**

United States – Attacks 2011-2016

175 Incidents



Source: START Data Base,


http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=10/1/2016&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&sAttack=1,0

10/1/2016


United States – Casualties: 2011-2016

175 Incidents

Total Casualties



Deaths




Source: START Data Base,

[http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=casualties&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2012&end_yearonly=2016&](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=casualties&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2012&end_yearonly=2016&typeall&country=217)

typeall&country=217.

Jihadist vs. Non-Jihadist Sources of Terrorism in the U.S. Through 2016, Less 9/11: New America Foundation - I

Terrorism Related Cases: 2001-2016



Citizenship Status at Time of Charge or Death

Hover over a square for more detail on the individual cases.

Citizens and Permanent Residents

85%

Non-residents and Unknown

15%




■ 206 U.S. Born Citizen ■ 87 Naturalized Citizen ■ 11 Citizen of Unknown Status

■ 47 Permanent Resident ■ 14 Nonimmigrant Visa ■ 7 Visa-Free Travel Eligible Individual

■ 5 Illegal Immigrant ■ 16 Refugee or Asylum Seeker ■ 20 Unknown

Jihadist vs. Non-Jihadist Sources of Terrorism in the U.S. Through 2016, Less 9/11: New America Foundation - II




Of the thirteen lethal jihadist terrorists in the United States since 9/11:

- three are African-Americans
- three are from families that hailed originally from Pakistan
- one was born in Kuwait to Palestinian-Jordanian parents
- one is a White convert born in Texas.
- two came from Russia as children
- one emigrated from Egypt and conducted his attack a decade after coming to the United States
- and one each had families that originally came from Kuwait and Afghanistan


Jihadists by Age and Marital Status

Far from being young hotheads, jihadists in the United States range across ages, with the average age in the late 20s, and many are or have been married. Hover over a square for more detail on the individual cases.



Online Radicalization

Percentage of extremists who maintained a social media profile with jihadist material or utilized encryption for plotting since 9/11. Hover over a bar for more detail on the number of individuals who were charged or died in each year.



Terrorism versus Hate Crimes: FBI 2016 Report

The START database on terrorism reported a total of 38 incidents of terrorism in the U.S. in 2015. START reported that 16 of these 38 attacks had some connection to religion, but did not specify the faith involved.

In contrast, criminal acts of racism still present a major challenge in U.S. society. They make up more than 59 percent of all "single bias" hate crimes—over 3,440 incidents, 5,850 criminal incidents and 6,885 related offenses motivated by bias against race, ethnicity, ancestry, religion, sexual orientation, disability, gender, or gender identity. Religion was the second greatest cause of hate crimes — 59.2 percent were targeted because of a race/ethnicity/ancestry bias; 19.7 percent because of a religious bias; and 17.7 percent because of a sexual orientation bias. These three causes alone led to the targeting of 96.6 percent of "single bias" hate crimes.

The worst terrorist attacks did have more fatal human consequences in terms of fatalities than hate crimes. They killed a total of 44 persons in 2015 and injured 52 others—a total of 96 victims inside the United States.



Hate caused far more injuries, however, than terrorism. The FBI reports that 4,482 victims of hate crimes were victims of crimes against persons in 2015:

- 18 persons were murdered and 13 were raped. (Concerning rape, data for 12 rapes were submitted under the UCR Program's revised definition; 1 rape was submitted under the legacy definition).
- 41.3 percent of the victims were intimidated.
- 37.8 percent were victims of simple assault.
- 19.7 percent were victims of aggravated assault.
- 0.4 percent (20) were victims of other types of offenses, which are collected only in the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).

If one compares the total victims from terrorism to the number of victims from hate crimes, 96 victims — including 44 murders — have to be compared to 7,121 victims of hate crimes, and 2,608 of these victims suffered from physical crimes against persons ranging from simple assault to murder. A total of 883 of this total suffered from aggravated assault, and there were 18 murders and 13 rapes.


Attitudes of American Muslims

Nine-in-ten U.S. Muslims proud to be American



Note: Figures may not add to 100% due to rounding.

Among U.S. Muslims, widespread concern about place in American society



Source: the Pew Research Center, U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, Survey Jan 3-may 22, 2017 <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/>

Panic vs. Policy: Comparative Actuarial Risk Posed by Terrorism in the U.S.

During 2005-2015, jihadists killed 94 people in the U.S. and 301,797 were shot dead (3,211:1)

[Dave Mosher](#) and [Skye Gould](#),

"How likely are foreign terrorists to kill Americans? The odds may surprise you," *Business Insider*, Jan. 31, 2017, 9:36 PM <http://www.businessinsider.com/death-risk-statistics-terrorism-disease-accidents-2017-1>

TERRORISTS POSE A VERY SMALL THREAT TO AMERICANS

CAUSE OF DEATH	LIFETIME ODDS
Heart disease	1 in 7
Cancer	1 in 7
Any injury	1 in 21
Chronic lung disease	1 in 27
Accidents	1 in 31
Stroke	1 in 31
Alzheimer's disease	1 in 47
Diabetes	1 in 53
Influenza/pneumonia	1 in 70
Kidney disease	1 in 85
Suicide	1 in 98
Any motor vehicle incident	1 in 113
Falling	1 in 133
Murder	1 in 249
Assault by gun	1 in 358
Car/van/truck incidents	1 in 565
Suffocation	1 in 608
Walking	1 in 672
Motorcycle	1 in 949
Drowning	1 in 1,183
Poisoning (liquid, gas, solid)	1 in 1,355
Fire or smoke	1 in 1,454
Assault by sharp object	1 in 2,448
Any force of nature	1 in 3,122

CAUSE OF DEATH	LIFETIME ODDS
Choking on food	1 in 3,409
Bicycling	1 in 4,337
Accidental gunshot	1 in 7,945
Police	1 in 8,359
Airplane and spaceship incidents	1 in 9,738
Heat wave	1 in 10,785
Electricity/radiation/heat/pressure	1 in 14,697
Animal attack or accident	1 in 30,167
Sharp objects accident	1 in 30,863
Foreign-born terrorists (all forms)	1 in 45,808
Tornado	1 in 60,000
Cataclysmic storm	1 in 63,685
Asteroid (global impact)	1 in 75,000
Legal execution	1 in 111,449
Dog attack	1 in 114,634
Earthquake	1 in 130,000
Bus, train, or streetcar	1 in 160,487
Lightning	1 in 174,443
Stinging by hornets, wasps, and bees	1 in 308,629
Asteroid (regional impact)	1 in 1,600,000
Shark attack	1 in 8,000,000
Refugee terrorists	1 in 46,192,893
Illegal immigrant terrorists	1 in 138,324,873
Visa Waiver Program entrant	0 in 1


NOTE: Most odds based on 2013 life expectancy, population, and death data. For infrequent events (e.g. asteroid), 2013 figures are assumed. Terrorism odds based on 41-year average (1975-2015).

SOURCES: National Safety Council; National Center for Health Statistics; Alex Nowrasteh/Cato Institute; Stephen A. Nelson/Tulane University; "Natural Disasters"/Patrick L. Abbott

BUSINESS INSIDER

**Extremism Poses a Critical
Threat to the Ability of
Largely Islamic States to
Meet the Needs of Their
Rapidly growing Populations**

Arab Support for “Arab Spring: 2016



Source: Arab Opinion Index, March 13, 2017, pp. 4.

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania**. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples..


Arab View of Causes of “Arab Spring: 2016

Explanations given for the outbreak of the uprisings of the Arab Spring	Most important	Second-most important	Averaged
Against corruption	25	6	16
Opposition to dictatorship	20	9	15
Response to economic circumstances	18	14	16
For the sake of political freedoms	10	7	9
To end injustice	5	15	10
To demand dignity	4	9	7
To demand democracy	4	9	7
To achieve equality and justice	3	11	7
Other reasons	3	1	2
Don't know/declined to answer	7	0	4
No second choice provided	0	19	9

Source: Arab Opinion Index, March 13, 2017, pp. 5.


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The Edge of Repression and Impact of Failed States




Economist.com

Sectarian Divisions in MENA




The New York Times | Source: M. Izady, Columbia University's Gulf 2000 project | Note: Non-Muslims and other Islamic sects are not shown.

The Broader “Kurdish Problem”



Source: Atlas-Syria: Federal Ministry of the interior, Republic of Austria, 2015,
http://www.ecoi.net/atlas_syria.pdf, p. 16


The Middle East: Demographic Pressure: 1950-2050 (In Millions)




	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
Bahrain	0.12	0.16	0.22	0.35	0.51	0.66	1.18	1.51	1.64	1.76	1.85
Egypt	21.2	26.85	33.57	42.63	54.91	65.16	80.47	96.26	111.06	125.24	137.87
Iran	16.36	21.6	28.99	39.71	58.1	68.63	76.92	86.54	93.46	97.69	100.05
Iraq	5.16	6.82	9.41	13.23	18.14	22.68	29.67	36.89	43.83	50.46	56.32
Kuwait	0.15	0.29	0.75	1.37	2.13	1.97	2.64	2.99	3.33	3.62	3.86
Libya	0.96	1.34	1.99	3.06	4.1	5.03	6.11	6.94	7.77	8.47	8.97
Oman	0.49	0.6	0.78	1.19	1.79	2.43	2.97	3.64	4.31	4.88	5.4
Qatar	0.03	0.05	0.11	0.23	0.43	0.64	1.72	2.44	2.6	2.55	2.56
Saudi Arabia	3.86	4.72	6.11	10.02	16.06	21.31	25.73	29.82	33.83	37.25	40.25
Syria	3.5	4.53	6.25	8.74	12.53	16.51	21.77	22.35	26.09	28.94	31.23
Tunisia	3.52	4.15	5.1	6.44	8.21	9.51	10.53	11.49	12.09	12.28	12.18
UAE	0.07	0.1	0.25	1	1.83	3.22	4.98	6.5	7.48	7.95	8.02
Yemen	4.78	5.87	7.1	9.13	12.42	17.24	23.21	29.88	35.66	41.14	46.08

Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed October 2015. <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>

Demographic Pressure in Gulf Countries: 1950-2050 (in Thousands)




The “Youth Bulge” (Percentage of Native Population Below 25)




Source: Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2015, Accessed March 2016,
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>

Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region (2008): The Threat From POAYMs




Population Density, Hyper-Urbanization and Water




Source: Strafor, [http://reliefweb.int/map/iraq/iraq-relative-population-density-23-july-2014](https://www.google.com/search?q=population+density+map+of+Levant&tbm=isch&imgil=q-IXqYU6ivLyIM%253A%253BI9PtpLbZ32-mwM%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Fwww.stratfor.com%25252Fimage%25252Fpopulation-density-greater-levant&source=iu&pf=m&fir=q-IXqYU6ivLyIM%253A%25252CI9PtpLbZ32-mwM%25252C&biw=1430&bih=953&usq=Cxn3aZK1_dZz1qKovl8VFKtJkDU%3D&ved=0ahUKEwjg2NjEkd7KAhUGIR4KHcXSB2IQjyKKA&ei=r0ezVqDFIIaqesWln5AG#imgsrc=q-IXqYU6ivLyIM%3A&usq=Cxn3aZK1_dZz1qKovl8VFKtJkDU%3D; and OCHA, <a href=)


Egypt = 43% Urbanization
Iran = 73% Urbanization
Iraq = 70% Urbanization
Jordan = 84% Urbanization
Saudi Arabia = 83% Urbanization
Syria = 58% Urbanization



Hyper Urbanization: 1950-2030




Percentages of Urbanization in 2016



Arab Views of National Political Conditions: 2016

Only 41 percent of Arab respondents viewed the political situation in their countries positively, but the responses varied widely among countries. For example, 83 percent of Saudi Arabians perceived the political atmosphere in their country as good or very good, compared with only 10 percent of Lebanese respondents; fully 65 percent of Lebanese respondents saw their situation as very bad




Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 2 .**

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Arab Attitudes Towards System of Government: 2016

Respondents' views of the appropriateness of a variety of different systems of government for their home countries




- An aggregate 77 percent of respondents considered democracy to be the most appropriate system of government for their countries.
- By comparison, only 34 percent considered a government built on Islamic Shari`a to be appropriate;
- 29 percent that electoral competition should be only between Islamist parties;
- 21 percent that this competition be limited to non-religious and secular parties; and
- 18 percent that an undemocratic or authoritarian government is appropriate.

Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 5 .**

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Attitudes Towards Democracy: 2016

Respondents' views of the appropriateness of a variety of different systems of government for their home countries




- Eighty-nine percent of Arab respondents provided coherent definitions of democracy in Arab society; chiefly,
- 33 percent said it safeguards civil and political rights,
- 26 percent thought it guaranteed equality and justice between citizens, and
- 11 percent defined it in terms of the system of government including the peaceful transfer of power and institutional checks and balances.

Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 3 .**

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Attitudes Towards Democracy: 2016

Cited factors for democracy



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
Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 5 .**

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
Arab Concern with Rule of Law: 2016

Less than a quarter (24 percent) of respondents believed that the rule of law is applied universally in their countries, while only 40 percent thought that fair trial principles are upheld, a belief that continued from previous years' data.

How is the rule of law applied in your home country?



To what extent is the principle of fair trial upheld in your home country?




Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 3 .**

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Arab Concern with Corruption: 2016


The 2016 Arab Opinion Index showed close similarities to respondents' views about the issue of corruption in previous years. Seventy-nine percent of Arab respondents viewed corruption to be widespread



Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 3 .**

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Transparency International Corruption Ranking by Country in 2016 (Out of 177)



Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index “The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be.”

Transparency International Summary of Public Views: 2016 - I

CORRUPTION IS PERCEIVED TO BE INCREASING

61%

of people think corruption has increased in the last year.



BRIBERY IS WIDESPREAD

Nearly 1 in 3

paid a bribe in the last year, or around 50 million people

GOVERNMENTS ARE FAILING TO FIGHT CORRUPTION

68%



say their government is doing badly

26%



say their government is doing well

COURTS ARE THE WORST, POLICE AREN'T MUCH BETTER

Almost

1 in 3

who dealt with the courts paid a bribe



1 in 4

people who dealt with police paid a bribe



VICTIMS ARE INTIMIDATED INTO SILENCE

Only

1 in 5

bribe payers report the incident



2 in 5

who do report corruption suffer retaliation



30%

fear retaliation if they speak out about corruption






Almost a third say people in the region don't report corruption because they fear the consequences.


Transparency International Summary of Public Views: 2016 - II

HOW MANY PEOPLE THINK CORRUPTION HAS INCREASED?

The percentage of people who say corruption has increased a lot or somewhat over the past 12 months.



How Corrupt is the MENA Public Sector? (2016)



Q. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Base: all respondents, excluding missing responses. Chart shows the percentage of respondents who answered either "Most/all" of them, "Some" or "None" are corrupt on average across the seven public sector groups: the president's office, Members of Parliament, government officials, tax officials, the police, judges and magistrates, and local government councillors. "Don't know" responses are not shown for ease of comparison.

Transparency International Summary of Public Views: 2016 - III


Who is perceived as corrupt

Q. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? % who say "Most" or "All" are corrupt.


Base: all respondents, excluding missing responses.

COUNTRY	PRESIDENT /PRIME MINISTER	MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT	GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	LOCAL COUNCILLORS	POLICE	TAX OFFICIALS	JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES	TRADITIONAL LEADERS	RELIGIOUS LEADERS	BUSINESS EXECUTIVES
Algeria	31	39	39	39	25	40	28	17	17	37
Egypt	12	NOT ASKED	27	36	26	26	20	19	14	38
Jordan	26	36	34	24	12	28	17	17	16	33
Lebanon	69	79	79	67	41	80	52	62	42	64
Morocco	20	36	35	39	34	31	34	21	10	34
Palestine	36	31	38	30	30	39	26	27	22	32
Sudan	33	42	43	43	42	51	25	25	16	37
Tunisia	18	17	31	32	26	23	17	9	15	47
Yemen	49	77	79	51	74	83	60	68	16	37

How is Government Doing in Fighting Corruption?




Who Do You Bribe? (2016)



Q. And how often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour for A. A teacher or school official?; B. A health worker or clinic or hospital staff; C. A government official in order to get the document?; D. A government official in order to get the [Utilities] services?; E. A police officer?; F. A judge or court official? Base: Respondents who had contact with each service in the past 12 months, excluding missing responses. An asterisk (*) denotes a service base size of less than 60 respondents. These results are not shown as there are too few respondents to be considered statistically reliable.

GDP Per Capita By Country



Real World Limits of OPEC Oil Wealth: 2012-2016

(in Constant \$2016 US)

Total Revenues (In 2016 \$US Billions)


Country	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Algeria	63.9	56	48.2	25.9	19.2
Angola	71.7	68.7	58.8	33	26.1
Ecuador	10	9.4	8.8	5.1	4.3
Gabon	9	8.2	7.3	3.7	3
Iran	68.3	48.8	50.7	29.4	36.2
Iraq	91.2	88.4	87.6	57.9	53.5
Kuwait	97.5	93.3	80.5	44.3	37.5
Libya	52.5	29.8	8.2	3.2	2.3
Nigeria	96.9	86.9	77.9	37.1	25.6
Qatar	69.4	66.9	58.8	30.4	24
Saudi Arabia	368.9	344.6	301.1	159.3	133
UAE	112.2	107.6	98	56.4	46.8
Venezuela	70.8	69	60.5	29.6	21.8
OPEC	1182.4	1077.5	946.5	515.4	433.4

Per Capita Revenues in 2016 \$US)

Country	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Algeria	1707.3	1467	1238.9	653.3	475.6
Angola	3162.8	2932	2429.3	1321.5	1011.4
Ecuador	647.8	601.4	554.3	313.7	265.2
Gabon	5528.3	4892.9	4258.8	2129.8	1691.5
Iran	897.6	632.4	648.5	371.7	452.5
Iraq	2767.2	2591.7	2485.9	1590.4	1423.4
Kuwait	28543.9	25974	21466.3	11391.8	9343.7
Libya	8353	4746.7	1314.5	507.8	361.8
Nigeria	576.3	502.8	439.3	203.6	136.6
Qatar	34484.8	31834.2	27098	13610.5	10458.4
Saudi Arabia	12512.3	11408.1	9757.7	5055	4132.4
UAE	12530.1	11898.3	10792.8	6161.4	5043.2
Venezuela	2371.9	2278.1	1973.5	951.6	690.1
OPEC	2721.9	2424.1	2083.9	1109.9	912.4

Arab Views of National Economic Conditions: 2016

An aggregate majority (69 percent) of all Arab respondents said that their household income is sufficient for living. Forty-nine percent indicated that they cannot save any money, whereas twenty-nine percent said they were “in need” to cover necessary expenditures and had to rely on family and friends and on handouts to make ends meet. These figures have remained stable over the last five years.



Source: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS) in Doha, Qatar , **The 2016 Arab Opinion Index: Executive Summary, p. 2 .**


The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: **Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania**. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples..

**Islamic States are Key Strategic
Partners in the Fight Against
Extremism**

And

**The Rising Global Impact
of Islam Makes These
Partnerships Steadily More
Critical**

Most Heavily Muslim States Are Partners in the Fight Against Extremism





Most MENA States Are Critical Strategic Partners and Keys to Containing and Defeating Extremism

(MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA REGION)



The Global Impact of Islam will Increase Massively in 2010-2050



The Fight Against Extremism Must react to the Changing Demographics of Islam Relative to Other Faiths: 2010-2050

- Muslims increase from 1.60 billion in world (23.2%) in 2010 to 2.67 billion (29.7%) in 2050.
- Muslims in MENA increase from 317 million (93.0%) in 2010 to 551.9 million (93.7%) in 2050.

REGION	YEAR	POPULATION	CHRISTIAN	MUSLIM	UNAFFIL.	HINDU	BUDDHIST	FOLK	OTHER	JEWISH
Asia-Pacific	2010	4,054,940,000	7.1	24.3	21.2	25.3	11.9	9.0	1.3	< 0.1
	2050	4,937,900,000	7.7	29.5	17.0	27.7	9.6	7.4	1.0	< 0.1
Europe	2010	742,550,000	74.5	5.9	18.8	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
	2050	696,330,000	65.2	10.2	23.3	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2
Latin America-Caribbean	2010	590,080,000	90.0	0.1	7.7	0.1	< 0.1	1.7	0.2	< 0.1
	2050	748,620,000	88.9	0.1	8.7	< 0.1	< 0.1	1.9	0.2	< 0.1
Middle East-North Africa	2010	341,020,000	3.7	93.0	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.3	< 0.1	1.6
	2050	588,960,000	3.1	93.7	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.4	< 0.1	1.4
North America	2010	344,530,000	77.4	1.0	17.1	0.7	1.1	0.3	0.6	1.8
	2050	435,420,000	65.8	2.4	25.6	1.3	1.4	0.6	1.5	1.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	2010	822,730,000	62.9	30.2	3.2	0.2	< 0.1	3.3	0.2	< 0.1
	2050	1,899,960,000	58.5	35.2	2.7	0.1	< 0.1	3.2	0.2	< 0.1
World	2010	6,895,850,000	31.4	23.2	16.4	15.0	7.1	5.9	0.8	0.2
	2050	9,307,190,000	31.4	29.7	13.2	14.9	5.2	4.8	0.7	0.2


**ISIS, Al Qaida and the Taliban
Are Key *Current* Threats,**

But

**Only One Small Part of a Far
Broader Problem that Will
Endure for Decades**

The Rise of ISIS: 2000-2014


ISIS's attacks are growing faster than attacks by other terrorist organizations. From 2013–2014 the number of attacks by ISIS increased 233 percent from 373 to 1,241.



SOURCE
Global Terrorism Database



All Al Qaida and Islamic State Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016




Source: START,

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20029&perpetrator=40151&dtpt2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Kurdish Battalions (AQKB); Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State in Bangladesh; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL))


Number of ISIS and Al Qaida Terrorist Attacks in Key U.S. Conflict Countries 2011-2016



Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt. **Perpetrators:** (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Islamic Struggle Front)

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&ctp2=al
 &country=4,95,147,153,182,1004,195,200,228

Number of ISIS and Al Qaida Terrorist Attacks in Key U.S. Conflict Countries 2011-2016



ears: (between 2011 and 2016)


All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Kurdish Battalions (AQKB); Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL))

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&country=4&country=95&country=200&perpetrator=40103&perpetrator=20029&perpetrator=20030&perpetrator=20493&perpetrator=20522&perpetrator=20032&perpetrator=40325&perpetrator=20033&perpetrator=20496&perpetrator=20534&perpetrator=20492&perpetrator=20494&perpetrator=40635&perpetrator=20225&perpetrator=40151&dtb2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=

Weapons types in ISIS and Al Qaida Terrorist Attacks in Key U.S. Conflict Countries 2011-2016

5,803 incidents




Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt. **Perpetrators:** (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Islamic Struggle Front)

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=al
&country=4,95,147,153,182,1004,195,200,228

Target Types in ISIS and Al Qaida Terrorist Attacks in Key U.S. Conflict Countries 2011-2016


5,803 incidents



Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt. **Perpetrators:** (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL); Islamic Struggle Front)

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&dtp2=al
 &country=4,95,147,153,182,1004,195,200,228

All Elements Labeled as Al Qaida Causing Terrorist Attacks Worldwide 2011-2016




Source :START data base. All incidents regardless of doubt. Includes (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida Kurdish Battalions (AQKB); Al-Qaida Network for Southwestern Khulna Division; Al-Qaida Organization for Jihad in Sweden; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in Yemen; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM))

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&start_year=&start_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&perpetrator=40151&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=


All incidents regardless of doubt.

Number of Al Qaida Terrorist Attacks in Key U.S. Conflict Countries 2011-2016



Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt. **Perpetrators:** (Al-Nusrah Front; Al-Qaida; Al-Qaida in Iraq; Al-Qaida in Lebanon; Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia; Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent; Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&ctp2=al&country=4,95,147,153,182,1004,195,200,228


Number of ISIS Terrorist Attacks in Key U.S. Conflict Countries 2011-2016



Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt. **Perpetrators:** (Islamic State in Bangladesh; Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS); Islamic State of Iraq (ISI); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL))

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=country&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&ctp2=al&country=4,95,147,153,182,1004,195,200,228

Comparative Patterns of Terrorist Incidents in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen: 2011-2016




Source: START Data Base,


http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dt2=all&sAttack=1,0

Key Trends in Terrorism: Worldwide and In Iraq and Afghanistan


Total fatalities in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and worldwide, 2000 – 2016



Types of targets of terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 - 2016




START Estimate of Attacks In/near U.S. Combat in 2015




But, Even Total Victory in Syria and Iraq will Only Have a Limited Impact:

Most IISS “Affiliates” Outside Iraq and Syria Are Not Closely Linked to the ISIS “Caliphates” and Will Survive ISIS Defeats in Iraq and Syria

**WP
Estimate
of
10/2015**



START Estimate of ISIS Affiliate Attacks in 2011-2016 - I



Years: (between 2011 and 2016).

All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State; Al-Shabaab; Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin; Algeria Province of the Islamic State; Ansar Al-Khilafa (Philippines); Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia); Bahrain Province of the Islamic State; Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM); Barqa Province of the Islamic State; Boko Haram; Caucasus Province of the Islamic State; Fezzan Province of the Islamic State; Hadramawt Province of the Islamic State; Hijaz Province of the Islamic State; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Islamic State in Bangladesh; Jamaah Ansharut Daulah; Jund al-Khilafa; Jund al-Khilafah (Tunisia); Jundallah (Iran); Jundallah (Pakistan); Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State; Lahij Province of the Islamic State; Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT); Najd Province of the Islamic State; Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade; Sanaa Province of the Islamic State; Shabwah Province of the Islamic State; Sheikh Omar Hadid Brigade; Sinai Province of the Islamic State; Supporters of the Islamic State in Jerusalem; Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Tehrik-e-Khilafat; Tripoli Province of the Islamic State)

ISIS Role in Worldwide Attacks: 2002-2015

Attack Patterns of ISIL-Related and Non-ISIL-Related Terrorist Attacks

	Total Attacks	% Lethal	Total Deaths per Attack	% Suicide	% Hostages/ Kidnapping	% Coordinated Attacks
ISIL-Related	4943	74.7	7.3	19.3	11.5	38.5
<i>ISIL Predecessors</i>	877	81.6	8.6	23.8	6.2	51.7
ISIL	2858	75.7	7.5	19.0	12.8	38.6
<i>ISIL-Affiliated</i>	1182	67.1	5.8	17.2	12.5	29.2
<i>ISIL-Inspired</i>	26	84.6	1.9	0.0	11.5	11.5
Non-ISIL-Related	78345	51.4	2.1	4.6	7.5	13.3
Total	83288	52.7	2.4	5.4	7.8	14.8

START: Active ISIS Affiliates: 2014-2015

Ten Most Active ISIL Affiliates, 2014-2015

Perpetrator Group	Location	Total Attacks	Total Deaths	Perpetrators Killed	Total Hostages/ Kidnapped
Boko Haram	West Africa	397	4242	1001	405
Sinai Province of the Islamic State	Egypt	173	624	168	33
Tripoli Province of the Islamic State	Libya	145	184	28	239
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)	Philippines	136	105	37	4
Barqa Province of the Islamic State	Libya	94	230	23	66
Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State	Af/Pak	86	390	184	142
Sanaa Province of the Islamic State	Yemen	29	304	12	0
Tehrik-e-Khilafat	Pakistan	14	8	0	0
Islamic State in Bangladesh	Bangladesh	13	8	1	0
Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State	Yemen	11	33	4	1

As new and established organizations began making declarations of allegiance to ISIL, the network expanded dramatically. In 2014, 11 ISIL-affiliated perpetrator groups carried out terrorist attacks in eight different countries, and in 2015 a total of 27 ISIL-affiliated groups carried out attacks in 20 different countries. The 10 most active ISIL affiliates are listed in the table below, along with information about their attack patterns. Note that for organizations that existed prior to pledging allegiance to ISIL, such as Boko Haram, the table includes only those attacks that they carried out as ISIL affiliates. Thus, the time periods included for each group are not directly comparable.

The ISIL affiliates responsible for the most terrorist attacks and deaths are certainly those that were the most well-established organizations prior to indicating their allegiance to ISIL, and/or had declared allegiance to ISIL the earliest. These include Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Sinai Province (formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) in Egypt, and BIFM in the Philippines. ISIL's presence in Libya was precipitated by Libyan fighters returning from Iraq and Syria—militants who had organized as the Islamic Youth Shura Council, which splintered from Ansar al-Sharia.¹⁰

Terrorist attacks by both ISIL and ISIL affiliates were characterized by a high proportion of perpetrator deaths—24 percent and 23 percent of total deaths, respectively—compared to attacks that were not linked to ISIL, in which 17 percent of all deaths were perpetrator deaths. The affiliates whose attacks resulted in the highest proportion of perpetrators among those killed were the Khorasan Chapter in Afghanistan and Pakistan (47% of those killed in attacks were perpetrators), BIFM (35%), the Sinai Province (27%), and Boko Haram (24%). More than one-fifth (22%) of the Boko Haram and Sinai Province assailants who were killed died in suicide attacks. Attacks in which especially large numbers of perpetrators were killed typically involved numerous assailants attacking a security target, or security forces responding to a major attack targeting civilians.

A key distinction of the attacks by ISIL-inspired perpetrators, all of which occurred in 2014 and 2015, is that they took place in locations where terrorist attacks were relatively rare compared to where ISIL and ISIL affiliates were typically active. Eight of the ISIL-inspired attacks took place in the United States, six in France, four in Australia, two in Denmark, two in Canada; the Gaza Strip, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines each experienced one ISIL-inspired attack.


The Current Fighting in Syria and Iraq is Unlikely to Bring Any Lasting Security and Stability

ISIS Loss of Control in Iraq and Syria 2015-2017

Jan 2015



July 2017




Source: Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-battered-isis-grows-ever-more-dependent-on-lone-wolves-simple-plans/2017/07/19/3eeef9e8-6bfa-11e7-96ab-5f38140b38cc_story.html?utm_term=.2c0eb5316ef2

Source: IHS Jane's Conflict Monitor as of July 10

THE WASHINGTON POST

ISIS: January 2016

January 2016




Source: BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>, 20 July 2017

10/17/2017

109

ISIS: June 2017




Source: BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>, 20 July 2017

10/17/2017


110

ISIS: August 31, 2017




Conflict Monitor by IHS Markit (ISIS Areas of control as of Aug. 28) By The New York Times

BBC Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: July 17, 2017




Source: BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>, 20 July 2017

DoD Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: July 17, 2017



BBC Map of Iraq and Syria Zones of Control: September 4, 2017




Source: BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>, 6 September 2017

10/17/2017

114

ISIS Revenues: 2014-2016



*2015 kidnapping figure is unknown

Note: Amounts shown are upper estimates. Other income comes from the sale of antiquities and foreign donations, but is not thought to be significant.

Source: ICSR

BBC

Coast of Coalition Operations: 8-8 2014 to 6-30-2017

Average Daily Cost

Daily Cost (\$M)	8 Aug - 19 Sep 2014 (Ops in Iraq; Pre-Syria, 43 days)	20 Sep 2014 - 30 June 2017 (Ops in Syria and Iraq, 1015 days)	Average Daily Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 30 June 2017, 1058 days)
BY EXPENSE			
Daily Flying OPTEMPO	\$ 3.7	\$ 5.1	\$ 5.1
Daily Ship OPTEMPO	\$ 0.2	\$ 0.0	\$ 0.0
Munitions	\$ 0.7	\$ 3.2	\$ 3.1
Mission Support	\$ 1.1	\$ 5.6	\$ 5.4
Total:	\$ 5.6	\$ 13.9	\$ 13.6
BY SERVICE			
Army	\$ 0.3	\$ 2.7	\$ 2.6
Navy	\$ 1.9	\$ 1.6	\$ 1.6
Air Force	\$ 2.5	\$ 8.6	\$ 8.3
SOCOM	\$ 0.8	\$ 1.0	\$ 1.0
Total:	\$ 5.6	\$ 13.9	\$ 13.6

Total Cost

Extrapolated Total Cost (\$M):	Total Cost (8 Aug 2014 - 30 June 2017, 1058 days)	% of Total
BY EXPENSE		
Daily Flying OPTEMPO	\$ 5,356	37%
Daily Ship OPTEMPO	\$ 23	0%
Munitions	\$ 3,230	22%
Mission Support	\$ 5,747	40%
Total:	\$ 14,356	100%
BY SERVICE		
Army	\$ 2,782	19%
Navy	\$ 1,742	12%
Air Force	\$ 8,800	61%
SOCOM	\$ 1,031	7%
Total:	\$ 14,356	100%

Coalition Airpower: 8-8-2014 to 9-30-2017 - I

OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE

Close Air Support/Escort/Interdiction*

Number of Weapons Released

Less Activity



More Activity

Sorties		Sorties with at least one weapon release			Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2014	6,591			2014								269	931	1,746	1,458	1,888	6,292
2015	21,116	2014	2,003	2015	2,426	1,853	1,685	1,862	2,145	1,683	2,823	2,758	2,380	2,694	3,242	3,145	28,696
2016	21,181	2015	9,912	2016	2,718	2,090	2,052	2,582	2,341	3,160	2,439	2,244	2,427	3,038	2,709	2,943	30,743
2017	14,780	2016	11,825	2017	3,600	3,439	3,878	3,274	4,374	4,848	4,313	5,075	3,550				36,351
		2017	9,088														

* Statistics provided includes numbers of sorties (not strikes) and munitions expended by aircraft under CFACC control

	2014	2015	2016	2017
Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties	2,373	9,514	12,270	11,361
Airlift and Airdrop Sorties	1,992	10,050	8,400	6,696
Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)*	14,555	78,500	72,800	50,202
Airlift Passengers*	9,900	47,200	46,900	53,885
Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)	1,417,900	111,200	822,171	380,438
Tanker Sorties	4,859	14,737	13,064	10,374
Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)	282	912	804	599
Aircraft Refuelings	28,956	84,381	80,912	52,578

* Iraq only

Coalition Airpower: 8-8-2014 to 9-30-2017 - II

Operation Inherent Resolve – destroying ISIS in Iraq and Syria Coalition airpower continued its annihilation of ISIS, releasing more than 3,550 weapons, a 30 percent decrease from the record high set in August. September also marked a key milestone for the Coalition, surpassing 100,000 weapons employed since OIR began in August 2014. During the month of September, Coalition airstrikes successfully eliminated five high-value ISIS targets.


On Sept. 4, Coalition aircraft killed Al-Shami as he rode a motorcycle near Mayadin, Syria. Al-Shami led ISIS' efforts to procure explosives and build bombs for external terrorist acts. The same engagement also resulted in the destruction of the bomb-making lab Al-Shami was en route to. On the same day, Junaid ur Rehman, a senior ISIS drone pilot trainer and engineer, was killed by a precision airstrike south of Mayadin in the village of Al-Asharah, Syria. On Sept. 12 and 13 respectively, three individuals tied to ISIS' unmanned aerial surveillance network were targeted and killed, including Abu Mawad Al-Tunisi, Sajid Farooq Babar and Abu Salman. The removal of these high value ISIS members disrupts and degrades ISIS' warfighting capabilities on the battlefield.

As Syrian regime forces advanced on Deir ez-Zor city, the convergence of regime and Coalition partner ground forces in this area called for increased awareness and de-confliction so as to avoid strategic miscalculations in the air or on the ground. As a result, Coalition and Russian military officials, including Coalition air planners from the Combined Air Operations Center, met face-to-face to adjust and expand de-confliction measures. The discussions emphasized the need to share operational graphics and locations to ensure the prevention of accidental targeting or other possible frictions that would distract from the defeat of ISIS. Non-kinetic effects continue to play a critical role in our efforts to defeat ISIS. During the month of September, the Coalition airdropped more than four million leaflets in Iraq and Syria. These leaflets were instrumental in countering ISIS propaganda, informing civilians of

Coalition efforts to liberate them from ISIS, and mitigating civilian casualties by telling them how to avoid being hurt by airstrikes and how to safely evacuate. According to Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve, these measures were effective. With the support of Coalition airpower, ISIS continues to face defeat in Raqqa. The SDF have now cleared more than 75 percent of the entire city. Additionally, the SDF also commenced clearance operations against ISIS in the Khabur River Valley, northwest of Deir ez-Zor. Finally, Coalition aircraft continue to support the Government of Iraq as they continue to defeat ISIS and liberate the few remaining holdouts in Iraq. More than 42,000 square kilometers have been cleared and more than 4 million people are now free from ISIS control.

Coalition Air Campaign: September 2014-August 16, 2017 - II

US-led coalition strikes: **IRAQ: 12,468, SYRIA: 11,205**



Source: IHS Conflict Monitor, 16 Aug 2017

BBC

Source: BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>, 6 September 2017


10/17/2017

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Coalition Air Campaign: September 2014-August 16, 2017 - I

Coalition strikes

■ Iraq 12,468 ■ Syria 11,205



*Figures are up to 16 August 2017


Source: US Central Command

BBC

Syria Refugees: As of July 6, 2017

More than 5 million Syrians have fled abroad to escape the fighting in Syria, according to the UN. Most have ended up in neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

Syrians have taken refuge in neighbouring countries



Source: UNCHR, 6 Jul 2017


BBC

About 950,000 Syrians have applied for asylum in Europe since April 2011, according to UN figures.

The UN estimates there are more than 3 million Iraqis who have been forced to leave their homes to escape the conflict with IS and are displaced within the country.

The battle for control of Mosul led to more than 920,000 people fleeing their homes for nearby refugee camps or relatives' homes.

Iraq and Syria Sunni Dominated Areas: 2017



The Broader Kurdish Issue: 2017



Estimated number of Kurds (per country)

TURKEY

14.3 million



18% of Turkish population

IRAQ

5.6 million



15% of Iraqi population

IRAN

8.2 million



10% of Iranian population

SYRIA

1.5 million



9% of Syrian population


Source: CIA

GENE THORP/THE WASHINGTON POST

Source: Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/21/the-quest-for-an-independent-kurdistan-enters-a-new-phase/?utm_term=.0d60d6fcf769

Iraq 2011-2016


15,620 Incidents



Source: START Data Base,

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dt2=all&sAttack=1,0

Iraq: Ten Years of Sunni Terrorist Attacks: 2004-2013



2004-05 The group emerges as "Al Qaeda in Iraq" following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Its goal is to provoke a civil war.


2006-07 The group's February 2006 bombing of one of Iraq's most revered Shiite shrines ignites sectarian violence across the country. After merging with several other Sunni insurgent groups, it changes its name to the Islamic State of Iraq.

2008-10 I.S.I. claims responsibility for more than 200 attacks, many in densely-populated areas around Baghdad.

2011-12 The group is relatively quiet for most of 2011, but re-emerges after American troops withdraw from Iraq.

2013 Seeing new opportunities for growth, I.S.I. enters Syria's civil war and changes its name to reflect a new aim of establishing an Islamic religious state spanning Iraq and Syria. Its success in Syria bleeds over the border to Iraq.


ISW Estimate of Zones of Control in Iraq: 6.17



Iraq:


Post Mosul Ethnic and Sectarian Divisions: 2017

Source: Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2016/11/23/isis-a-catastrophe-for-sunnis/?utm_term=.a8a5335e94c2



Syria 2011-2016

1,800 Incidents




Source: START Data Base,

10/17/2017

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dt2=all&sAttack=1,0

ISIS in Syria, July 10, 2017




Source: Janes by IHS Markit as of July 10

THE WASHINGTON POST

Syria

Zones of Control: July 2017

Source:
Washington
Post
:https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-russia-agree-to-collaborate-backing-cease-fire-in-southwest-syria/2017/07/07/2fcbfb5e-633b-11e7-a4f7-af34fc1d9d39_story.html?utm_term=.19120a0430a9



This is Even More True of the Fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Coalition Airpower: 2012 to 9-30-2017

OPERATION FREEDOM'S SENTINEL/RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION

Close Air Support*

Number of Weapons Released

Less Activity



More Activity

Afghanistan

Sorties		Sorties with at least one weapon release		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2012	28,760	2012	1,975	170	116	227	252	406	521	504	589	385	414	297	202	4,083
2013	21,900	2013	1,408	193	297	250	284	368	337	256	158	232	189	118	76	2,758
2014	12,978	2014	1,136	92	114	95	115	164	272	205	437	441	217	87	126	2,365
2015	5,774	2015	411	40	30	47	31	41	109	79	156	111	203	69	31	947
2016	5,162	2016	615	127	115	58	62	89	94	160	108	162	205	92	65	1,337
2017	3,307	2017	841	54	200	203	460	328	389	350	503	751				3,238

* Statistics provided includes numbers of sorties (not strikes) and munitions expended by aircraft under CFACC control

Combined Data (minus OIR)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties	34,937	31,049	32,999	21,634	19,681	14,221
Airlift Sorties	39,000	32,000	17,040	6,900	10,300	8,560
Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)	265,000	201,000	158,400	50,000	69,200	63,867
Airlift Passengers	749,000	506,000	202,700	78,000	111,100	91,027
OEF Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)	41,952,000	10,883,000	28,000	0	0	12,163
Tanker Sorties	16,007	12,319	9,085	5,323	4,910	4,329
Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)	980	723	636	201	150	120
Aircraft Refuelings	67,020	53,266	46,793	26,162	18,137	12,953
Casualty Evacuation Sorties	2,171	576	115	1	0	0
Saves	1,187	219	32	3	1	0
Assists	1,646	477	84	0	0	0

Coalition Airpower: 2014 to 8-31-2017 - II

Operation Freedom's Sentinel & Resolute Support Mission – advising Afghan Air Forces & countering terrorism

In August, the 555th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, the Triple Nickel, surpassed 555 bombs dropped and have now employed more than 600 weapons against ISIS-Khorasan and Taliban targets. August heralded the arrival of additional F-16s to bolster the ability to conduct kinetic strikes and over watch of friendly ground forces. The 774th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron conducted the first combat airdrop in Afghanistan in more than two years. The airdrop resupplied coalition ground forces and minimized risk to aircraft by avoiding the need to land at dangerous airfields.


Additionally, the 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron exercised with an Army Combat Aviation Brigade at Bagram and familiarized their Pararescue Airmen with the CH-47 Chinook helicopter. The training enhanced interoperability and educated 83th ERQS Airmen on army tactics and techniques. Lastly, the Afghan Air Force expanded their airdrop capabilities by conducting their first operational night drop on Aug. 22 using their C-208s.

The AAF also held a targeting exercise, or TTX, to introduce senior Afghan leadership to the concept and benefits of a targeting validation board. The TTX was well received and a successful first step toward establishment of a formal targeting board.



September marked a record high month for weapons employed in Afghanistan since 2012, with 751 munitions being delivered against Taliban and ISIS –Khorasan targets; a 50 percent jump from August. This increase can be attributed to the President's strategy to more proactively target extremist groups that threaten the stability and security of the Afghan people. Additionally, the recent addition of six F-16s at Bagram Air Base, coupled with more B-52 missions dedicated to Afghanistan ,offer the additional strike capacity needed to target these groups.

As part of this strategy, a key milestone was achieved in the effort to modernize and build up Afghanistan's nascent airpower capabilities, with the U.S. Air Force C-17 enabled delivery of the first two Afghan Air Force UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters on Sept. 18, at Kandahar Air Field. The UH-60s are the first of 159 that will be delivered to the AAF under the Aviation Transition and Modernization program, a \$6.8 billion, five-year effort to modernize and increase the AAF fleet. This fleet of UH-60s, as well as other strike and mobility aircraft, will provide firepower and mobility to enable the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to bring a decisive advantage to the fight against anti-government forces.

Incidents in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan: 1970-2016 (35,918 Incidents)



Highly Violent Incidents in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan : 1970-2016




Source: START Data Base, All incidents regardless of doubt.


http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=1970&end_yearonly=2016&ctp2=all®ion=8&weapon=6,5,8&attack=2,3

Number of Taliban and Haqqani Terrorist Attacks in Key U.S. Conflict Countries 2011-2016

5,194 incidents



Total Haqqani and Taliban Incidents in Afghanistan: 2011-2016 (5,165 Incidents)




Source: START, All incidents regardless of doubt.

Perpetrators: (Haqqani Network; Taliban; Taliban (Pakistan))

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=perpetrator&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_yearonly=2011&end_yearonly=2016&ctp2=all&country=4&perpetrator=20525,652,20529

Afghanistan: Major Attacks: May 2016-Mid August 2017


Number of people killed in major attacks



The New York Times | Source: Institute for the Study of War

[SARAH ALMUKHTAR](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/23/world/asia/afghanistan-us-taliban-isis-control.html), "How Much of Afghanistan Is Under Taliban Control After 16 Years of War With the U.S.?", NYT, 23.8.17, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/23/world/asia/afghanistan-us-taliban-isis-control.html>,


Afghanistan: ISW Estimate of Taliban Areas of Control: August 1, 2017




The New York Times | Source: Institute for the Study of War

ISW Estimate of Areas of Risk in Afghanistan: 11.23.16- 3.15.17

Source: ISW,
<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/map+/151a7e717269d3cb>




Long War Journal: Estimates of Afghan Taliban Controlled and Contested Districts: March 1, 2017



Bill Roggio, "Map of Taliban controlled and contested districts in Afghanistan'," Google Maps, March 1, 2017.

<https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=10Qz0dzWDWpj6bkfyWN6qoLhaaU&ll=33.73028742596195%2C59.147801487657716&z=6>


Taliban Claims of Its Percent of Control



% of Control	Color	Designation
100%	Black	Full Control
70-99%	Red	Heavily Contested
40-69%	Orange	Contested
10-39%	Yellow	Presence
0-9%	Green	Minimal Presence
Unknown	Grey	Unknown


Bill Roggio, "Afghan Taliban lists 'Percent of Country under the control of Mujahideen'," *Long War Journal*, March 28, 2017. <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/afghan-taliban-lists-percent-of-country-under-the-control-of-mujahideen.php>

Incidents in Pakistan: 2000-2015 (10,951 Incidents)



Pakistan 2011-2016


9,125Incidents



Source: START Data Base,

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dt2=all&sAttack=1,0


Attack Types in Pakistan: 2000-2015



Terrorism and Extremism in Yemen Have Become a Strategic “Black Hole”

Yemen 2011-2016

2,794 Incidents




Source: START Data Base,

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dt2=all&sAttack=1,0

Houthi and Al Qaida in Yemen 2011-2016

1,702 Incidents




Source: START Data Base,

10/17/2017

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dt2=all&sAttack=1,0

Houthi and Al Qaida in Saudi Arabia 2011-2016


142 Incidents



Source: START Data Base,

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?charttype=bar&chart=target&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2016&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dt2=all&sAttack=1,0


Yemen: August, 2017



Source: The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project

Yemen – Cholera - I

August, 2017




Source: World Health Organization

10/17/2017 Source: SHUAIB ALMOSAWA, [BEN HUBBARD](#) and [TROY GRIGGS](#), "It's a Slow Death': The World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis," *New York Times*, August 23, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/23/world/middleeast/100000005368038.app.html?nyttapp=ipad>.

Yemen – Cholera - II

August, 2017



Yemen – Cholera - III

August, 2017

